Coalgate: How Substandard Coal Burned Sri Lanka's Power Sector
A special audit, a sealed headquarters, and a Supreme Court-led commission expose systemic failures in Lakvijaya's coal procurement
An Auditor General's special report tabled in Parliament in April 2026 found that coal supplied to Sri Lanka's only coal power plant fell catastrophically short of contractual quality standards, triggering estimated losses of up to Rs. 8.5 billion. The scandal has led to a ministerial resignation, a Criminal Investigation Department raid, and a Presidential Commission of Inquiry mandated to examine all coal contracts since 2009. This report reconstructs what went wrong, who knew, and what accountability has followed.
The Specifications and the Shortfall
Lanka Coal Company (LCC) tender documents specify coal supplied to Lakvijaya must meet a Gross Calorific Value (GCV) of 6,150 kcal/kg, with a reject floor of 5,900 kcal/kg, ash content of 11% or below, and sulphur content of 0.5% or below — parameters derived from the plant's original design specification of 6,310 kcal/kg GCV. The Auditor General's Special Report (SPR/2026/01) confirmed that coal from Indian supplier Trident Chemphar recorded GCV readings as low as 4,805–5,760 kcal/kg across nine shipments, while discharge-port Cotecna analysis found ash content exceeding 21% — nearly double the contractual limit.
A Flawed Tender Process
The Auditor General found that Trident Chemphar had not completed its supplier registration by the tender advertisement date of 18 August 2024, yet was permitted to participate alongside two other unregistered suppliers — a breach of procurement fairness rules. The laboratory Trident relied upon to certify coal quality at the loading port had its accreditation licence revoked. Transparency International Sri Lanka filed Right to Information requests to LCC, the Ministry of Energy, and the National Procurement Commission, alleging the tender submission period was shortened and eligibility criteria amended in ways that may have favoured particular suppliers — allegations that remain under active investigation.
Financial and Operational Damage
The Auditor General estimated Rs. 2,237.7 million in losses from coal overconsumption and Rs. 2,332.5 million in recoverable penalties from Trident. The Public Utilities Commission of Sri Lanka placed total losses from nine substandard shipments at Rs. 8,497 million. Reduced coal-based generation forced greater reliance on diesel, estimated at approximately Rs. 75 million per day. A March 2026 COPE on-site inspection found no confirmed machinery damage, though the committee's own chairman acknowledged 'a certain reduction in output' and called for independent accredited laboratory testing. The PUCSL warned of potential power supply disruptions through July 2026.
Investigations and Accountability
The CID sealed LCC headquarters in April 2026 and began seizing documents following a complaint by the President's Secretary. Energy Minister Kumara Jayakody resigned in April 2026 and was questioned by the Presidential Commission on 1 July 2026. CIABOC had separately indicted Jayakody before the Colombo High Court under Section 70 of the Bribery Act for alleged corruption during his tenure as Procurement Manager of the Lanka Fertiliser Company — a distinct case. As of the time of reporting, no criminal charges directly related to the coal procurement itself had been publicly filed against CEB, LCC officials, or Trident Chemphar.
Structural Governance Failures
The ADB's Energy Sector Assessment had already flagged that 'CEB does not submit to PUCSL information required for economic, technical, and commercial regulatory activities.' The ADB's 2024–2028 Country Partnership Strategy identified weak regulation and incomplete CEB unbundling as structural constraints, while an ADBI working paper noted that 'opaque procurement processes increase the risk of corruption' in Sri Lankan SOEs. The audit found LCC unilaterally reduced contracted quantities without explanation, failed to invoke the contractual 'third umpire' testing mechanism when load-port and discharge-port data diverged, and left a 40-day procurement window unfilled — forcing an emergency purchase in March 2026.
Timeline
- 2024-08-18LCC advertises the 2025/26 coal supply tender; Trident Chemphar, later found to have not completed supplier registration by this date, is permitted to bid alongside two other unregistered suppliers.
- 2026-02-20Parliamentary COPE session hears that eligibility criteria for LCC supplier registration were relaxed pursuant to a 2023 Cabinet directive, a policy change not prominently disclosed in earlier oversight proceedings.
- 2026-03-03Parliamentary records show a generator was brought to Norochcholai to facilitate cooling of power generators, indicating operational stress at the plant during the substandard coal crisis.
- 2026-03-09Transparency International Sri Lanka files Right to Information requests to LCC, the Ministry of Energy, Ministry of Ports, and the National Procurement Commission seeking documents on the coal tender.
- 2026-04-02Auditor General's Special Report SPR/2026/01 is tabled in Parliament, estimating Rs. 2.24 billion in overconsumption losses and Rs. 2.33 billion in recoverable penalties from Trident Chemphar.
- 2026-04-12The Criminal Investigation Department seals LCC headquarters and begins seizing documents following a complaint by the President's Secretary demanding a probe into all coal imports since 2009.
- 2026-04-19Energy Minister Kumara Jayakody resigns amid the coal procurement scandal; President Dissanayake announces a Special Presidential Commission of Inquiry led by a Supreme Court judge with a six-month mandate.
- 2026-07-01Former Energy Minister Jayakody is questioned for approximately two hours by the Presidential Commission of Inquiry; the Commission had received 28 complaints and begun recording statements from LCC, Lakvijaya, and Energy Ministry officials.
Key claims & status
The Auditor General's Special Report SPR/2026/01 estimated Rs. 2,237.7 million in losses from coal overconsumption and Rs. 2,332.5 million in recoverable penalties from Trident Chemphar.
supportedFigures appear consistently across multiple reports citing the tabled audit document.
Trident Chemphar had not completed its supplier registration by the tender advertisement date of 18 August 2024, yet was permitted to participate in the tender.
supportedConfirmed by the Auditor General's report as tabled in Parliament and reported by multiple outlets.
The laboratory used by Trident Chemphar to certify coal quality at the loading port had its accreditation licence revoked.
supportedStated in the Auditor General's special audit report as reported by multiple outlets; primary document not independently reviewed by this publication.
The PUCSL estimated total losses from nine substandard coal shipments at Rs. 8,497 million.
supportedPUCSL figure reported consistently; higher than the Auditor General's estimate, reflecting different methodological scope.
The contractual 'third umpire' dispute-resolution testing mechanism was never invoked by LCC or the Ministry when load-port and discharge-port test data diverged.
supportedConfirmed by the Auditor General's report; LCC has not publicly explained the omission.
The tender submission period was shortened and eligibility criteria were amended in ways that may have favoured particular suppliers.
allegedRaised by TISL and opposition parliamentarians; under investigation by the Presidential Commission. Not yet proven.
Substandard coal caused approximately Rs. 75 million per day in additional diesel generation costs.
allegedFigure cited by CEB engineers and media; no independently verified audit calculation has been published for this specific daily cost estimate.
No criminal charges directly related to the coal procurement have been filed against CEB, LCC officials, or Trident Chemphar as of the time of reporting.
supportedThe CIABOC indictment against Jayakody relates to a separate matter at the Lanka Fertiliser Company, not the coal procurement itself.
Response / Right of reply
approved
Sources
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