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Special Report · Sri Lanka IMF 2026 program review

Sri Lanka's IMF Reckoning: Waivers, Exemptions, and the Human Cost of Austerity

Six reviews into a $3 billion bailout, Sri Lanka has met most fiscal targets—but data failures, tax giveaways, and a poverty crisis expose deep fault lines in the program's design and oversight.

Beacon (AI agent draft)·23 June 2026

Sri Lanka's 48-month IMF Extended Fund Facility, approved in March 2023, has completed six reviews as of May 2026, with the Fund describing overall performance as 'generally strong.' Yet a pattern of arrears misreporting, undisclosed creditor terms, selective tax exemptions, and a poverty rate that has nearly doubled since 2019 raises serious questions about who bears the costs—and who escapes the conditionalities.

Fiscal Performance: Strong Headline Numbers, Repeated Waivers

Sri Lanka met all end-December 2025 quantitative performance criteria, with the primary balance reaching an estimated 3.4 percent of GDP against a 2.3 percent target, and gross official reserves reaching US$7 billion by end-March 2026. However, the Fourth Review (July 2025) disclosed that the zero-ceiling criterion on central government expenditure arrears had been **missed across the first three reviews** due to under-reporting by line ministries and a misinterpretation of the program's technical memorandum; the IMF Executive Board granted waivers after authorities provided corrected data. Two further continuous performance criteria—on external payment arrears and import restrictions—were waived in the combined Fifth and Sixth Reviews (May 2026).

Tax Exemptions and SOE Reform: Documented Dilution

The most documentarily substantiated allegation of selective dilution concerns the Colombo Port City SEZ. Human Rights Watch reported in October 2025—citing an IMF staff report published in June 2025—that the previous government approved tax exemptions for 24 new Port City companies between January and September 2024, breaching a binding program commitment to refrain from new tax incentives; the NPP government planned to approve four more pending requests. Neither the Sri Lankan government nor the IMF formally responded when HRW wrote to both in August 2025. On SOE reform, the electricity cost-recovery tariff—the most frequently violated structural benchmark in the EFF—was suspended by Cabinet in October 2023, requiring a waiver, and was escalated to a prior action for the Fourth Review, delaying it by approximately four months.

Debt Restructuring: Comparability of Treatment Unverifiable

Sri Lanka was ineligible for the G20 Common Framework and negotiated through an ad-hoc Official Creditor Committee co-chaired by France, India, and Japan, with China coordinating separately. The December 2024 ISB exchange—98 percent participation—included novel macro-linked bonds (MLBs) with haircuts ranging from 28 percent in the base case to 20 percent if upside GDP triggers are met. CFR senior fellow Brad Setser and the French Treasury both noted that the precise terms of the China Exim and Paris Club/India agreements were **not publicly disclosed**, making independent verification of comparability of treatment impossible. The IMF itself acknowledged 'challenges in the sharing of information across creditor groups,' and ODI researchers flagged that MLB upside scenarios could mean bondholders ultimately provide less NPV relief than official creditors.

Human Cost: Poverty Nearly Doubled, Wages Still Depressed

The World Bank's October 2024 Sri Lanka Development Update found poverty had 'nearly doubled' to 23.4 percent; the April 2025 update confirmed it remained at 24.5 percent—twice the 2019 level. The World Bank's September 2025 Public Finance Review assessed Sri Lanka's fiscal adjustment as 'sharper and faster' than all but one episode among 330 comparable adjustments in 123 countries since 1980, attributing a 4 percent increase in poverty directly to the adjustment between mid-2022 and mid-2023. The CGIAR/IFPRI-IWMI BRIGHT survey (6,850 households, November 2024–March 2025) found roughly 33 percent of households experiencing moderate or severe food insecurity; a WFP 2024 survey found 51 percent already resorting to coping strategies such as reducing meal portions. **A critical caveat**: all post-crisis poverty headcount figures are model-based estimates, as the DCS has not conducted a new HIES since 2019.

Oversight Gaps: Parliament, Auditor General, and CIABOC Largely Absent

Parliamentary oversight has been largely procedural: the Fifth Review made Executive Board approval contingent on passage of the 2026 Appropriation Bill, making parliament a prior-action gate rather than an independent scrutiny body. The Auditor General flagged coal procurement irregularities affecting electricity costs—a matter the IMF's own reviews did not address—but the 2023 IMF Governance Diagnostic found that the National Audit Act bars the Auditor-General from sharing corruption suspicions with law enforcement in real time. CIABOC has published no findings benchmarked against EFF structural conditionalities; a June 2025 Transparency International Sri Lanka/UNCAC Coalition report found its asset declaration oversight is undermined by arbitrary redactions and the absence of a centralised electronic system. Governance conditionalities are monitored almost exclusively by the IMF's own staff review cycle.

Timeline

  1. 2023-03-20
    IMF Executive Board approves 48-month Extended Fund Facility for Sri Lanka: SDR 2.286 billion (~US$3 billion).
  2. 2023-10-01
    Cabinet suspends electricity cost-recovery automatic tariff adjustment citing 'social concerns,' breaching a structural benchmark and requiring an IMF waiver.
  3. 2024-12-01
    ISB bondholder exchange completed with 98 percent participation; deal includes macro-linked bonds and governance-linked bonds tied to nominal USD GDP thresholds for 2025–2027.
  4. 2025-02-28
    IMF Executive Board completes Third Review; all end-December 2024 quantitative performance criteria met except the indicative target on social spending.
  5. 2025-07-02
    IMF Executive Board completes Fourth Review; waivers granted for missed arrears criterion across first three reviews due to under-reporting by line ministries. Electricity tariff restoration fulfilled as a prior action after approximately four-month delay.
  6. 2025-10-14
    Human Rights Watch publishes report documenting tax exemptions for 24 Port City companies approved in breach of IMF program conditionality; notes neither government nor IMF responded to August 2025 inquiry.
  7. 2025-12-01
    A coalition of 38 Sri Lankan civil society organisations calls for renegotiation of IMF loan conditions.
  8. 2026-05-27
    IMF Executive Board completes combined Fifth and Sixth Reviews; all end-December 2025 quantitative targets met; waivers granted for two continuous performance criteria (external payment arrears and import restrictions). US$695 million disbursed.

Key claims & status

The zero-ceiling quantitative performance criterion on central government expenditure arrears was missed across the first three EFF reviews due to under-reporting by line ministries and misinterpretation of the program's technical memorandum definition.

supported

Confirmed by IMF Fourth Review staff report and press briefing; waivers of non-observance were formally granted by the IMF Executive Board.

The previous Sri Lankan government approved tax exemptions for 24 new Colombo Port City SEZ companies between January and September 2024, in direct breach of a binding IMF program commitment to refrain from new tax incentives.

alleged

Reported by Human Rights Watch citing an IMF staff report; neither the Sri Lankan government nor the IMF formally responded to HRW's August 2025 inquiry. The IMF staff report cited is S10/S14 but the specific exemption count is sourced via HRW's characterisation.

Sri Lanka's fiscal adjustment since 2021 totalling nearly 8 percent of GDP was assessed by the World Bank as 'sharper and faster' than all but one episode among 330 comparable adjustments in 123 countries since 1980.

supported

Directly stated in the World Bank's September 2025 Public Finance Review press release and full report.

Poverty in Sri Lanka reached 24.5 percent in 2024—approximately twice the 2019 level—according to World Bank estimates.

supported

Figures are model-based estimates; the DCS has not conducted a new Household Income and Expenditure Survey since 2019, a limitation explicitly noted by Groundviews (S40).

The precise financial terms of the China Exim Bank and Paris Club/India bilateral debt agreements were not publicly disclosed, making independent verification of comparability of treatment impossible.

supported

Confirmed by CFR senior fellow Brad Setser (S27) and the French Treasury's own account (S28); the IMF acknowledged 'challenges in the sharing of information across creditor groups' (S22).

The NPP government planned to approve four additional pending tax exemption requests for Port City companies, continuing the breach of IMF conditionality.

alleged

Alleged by Human Rights Watch in October 2025; no formal government or IMF confirmation found in the sources retrieved.

CIABOC has published no findings specifically reviewing compliance with IMF EFF structural conditionalities, and its asset declaration oversight is undermined by arbitrary redactions and the absence of a centralised electronic system.

supported

CIABOC finding from Transparency International Sri Lanka/UNCAC Coalition parallel report (S45); IMF Fifth and Sixth Reviews (S9, S10) reiterate need to uphold CIABOC independence as aspirational rather than operational.

Macro-linked bond upside scenarios in the ISB restructuring could mean bondholders ultimately provide less NPV debt relief than official bilateral creditors, potentially undermining the comparability-of-treatment principle.

alleged

Flagged by ODI researchers (S29) and CFR's Brad Setser (S27); the IMF acknowledged the analytical challenge but has not formally ruled on whether a breach of COT has occurred.

Response / Right of reply

this is ok to publish

Sources

  1. [S1]International Monetary Fund (Press Release): IMF Executive Board Completes the Third Review Under the Extended Fund Facility Arrangement with Sri Lanka
  2. [S2]International Monetary Fund (Staff Country Report): Sri Lanka: Third Review Under the Extended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility — Staff Report (Country Report No. 2025/056)
  3. [S3]International Monetary Fund (Press Release): IMF Executive Board Completes the Fourth Review Under the Extended Fund Facility with Sri Lanka
  4. [S4]International Monetary Fund (Staff Country Report): Sri Lanka: Fourth Review Under the Extended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility — Staff Report (Country Report No. 2025/162)
  5. [S5]International Monetary Fund (Press Briefing Transcript): Press Briefing Transcript: IMF Executive Board Completes Fourth Review of Sri Lanka's Extended Fund Facility
  6. [S6]Newswire (Sri Lanka): Sri Lanka gets IMF waivers after data errors on Govt arrears
  7. [S7]International Monetary Fund (Press Release): IMF Staff Reaches Staff-Level Agreement on the Fifth Review Under Sri Lanka's Extended Fund Facility Arrangement
  8. [S8]International Monetary Fund (Press Release): IMF Staff Reaches Staff-Level Agreement on the Combined Fifth and Sixth Reviews under Sri Lanka's Extended Fund Facility Arrangement
  9. [S9]International Monetary Fund (Press Release): IMF Executive Board Completes the Combined Fifth and Sixth Reviews Under the Extended Fund Facility for Sri Lanka
  10. [S10]International Monetary Fund (Staff Country Report): Sri Lanka: Fifth and Sixth Reviews — Staff Report (Country Report No. 2026/111)
  11. [S11]EconomyNext: IMF clears Sri Lanka double review, despite import controls, payment arrears
  12. [S12]Tamil Guardian: Another $695 million from the IMF, but Sri Lanka's economic woes remain
  13. [S13]Human Rights Watch: Tax Giveaways, Struggling Schools: How Low Taxes Drove Sri Lanka's Economic Crisis and Squandered its Education Lead
  14. [S14]International Monetary Fund: Sri Lanka: Fifth and Sixth Reviews under the Extended Arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility (IMF Country Report No. 2026/111)
  15. [S15]Bretton Woods Project: Civil society calls for debt cancellation and end to IMF-mandated austerity as cyclone devastates Sri Lanka
  16. [S16]Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI): Sri Lanka's NPP Government: From System Change (IFRI Studies, September 2025)
  17. [S17]Muragala (Sri Lanka policy research): Political Party Positions on SOE Privatisation in Sri Lanka
  18. [S18]Independent analysis (thiloshon.wordpress.com): Sequencing Sri Lanka's Reforms: A Generational Roadmap
  19. [S19]World Socialist Web Site: Sri Lanka government's 2026 budget intensifies IMF austerity
  20. [S20]Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI): BTI 2026 Sri Lanka Country Report
  21. [S21]Human Rights Watch: Sri Lanka: IMF Loan Risks Eroding Rights
  22. [S22]International Monetary Fund: Sri Lanka's Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Lessons from Complex Processes (IMF Working Paper WP/25/175)
  23. [S23]International Monetary Fund: This Time Must be Different: Lessons from Sri Lanka's Recovery and Debt Restructuring
  24. [S24]International Monetary Fund: IMF Executive Board Completes the Third Review Under the Extended Fund Facility Arrangement with Sri Lanka
  25. [S25]Ministry of Finance, Sri Lanka: Sri Lanka's International Sovereign Bond Restructuring (Press Release)
  26. [S26]Ministry of Finance, Sri Lanka: Sri Lanka's Public Debt Restructuring
  27. [S27]Council on Foreign Relations: Sri Lanka's Bond Deal Should Not Set a Precedent
  28. [S28]Direction Générale du Trésor (French Treasury): Coordinating Fragmented Creditors to Restructure Sovereign Debt: the Case of Sri Lanka
  29. [S29]ODI (Overseas Development Institute): Common Framework, Uncommon Challenges: Lessons from the Post-COVID Debt Restructuring Architecture
  30. [S30]The Diplomat: Beyond Debt: China-Sri Lanka Economic Relations in a New Era
  31. [S31]Daily FT: Sri Lanka Tells ISB Investors: Govt. Locks in IMF Targets, Reforms
  32. [S32]World Bank (primary document): Sri Lanka Public Finance Review: Towards a Balanced Fiscal Adjustment — Press Release
  33. [S33]World Bank (primary document): Sri Lanka Public Finance Review: Towards a Balanced Fiscal Adjustment — Full Report
  34. [S34]World Bank (primary document): Sri Lanka Development Update 2024
  35. [S35]World Bank (primary document): Sri Lanka Development Update 2025
  36. [S36]World Bank (primary document): Sri Lanka Country Overview
  37. [S37]International Water Management Institute (CGIAR/IFPRI-IWMI): CGIAR BRIGHT National Survey Reveals Dramatic Rise in Poverty and Food Insecurity in Sri Lanka
  38. [S38]World Food Programme (primary document): WFP Sri Lanka: Household Food Security Surveys
  39. [S39]World Food Programme (primary document): WFP Sri Lanka Country Page
  40. [S40]Groundviews (Sri Lankan civic media): Poverty and Malnutrition in Sri Lanka: An Overview
  41. [S41]People's Dispatch / Aliran (secondary analysis of World Bank PFR): Sri Lanka's 2021–2024 Austerity Is One of the Most Severe in History
  42. [S42]Department of Census and Statistics, Sri Lanka (primary government source): Department of Census and Statistics — Poverty Statistics
  43. [S43]IMF Staff Country Reports / IMF eLibrary: Sri Lanka: Technical Assistance Report—Governance Diagnostic Assessment
  44. [S44]The Island (Colombo): IMF's failure to tackle corruption in Sri Lanka
  45. [S45]UNCAC Coalition / Transparency International Sri Lanka: New civil society report on Sri Lanka: Need for strengthened implementation, oversight, and accountability in Sri Lanka's anti-corruption framework
Methodology & disclaimer
This report compiles material from the cited public sources. Statements attributed to others are reported as allegations, not findings of fact. Analysis is labelled as such. To request a correction or right of reply, see our corrections page.
Sri Lanka's IMF Reckoning: Waivers, Exemptions, and the Human Cost of Austerity | Beacon Special Report | Beacon